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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the decline in use of the Knight-Keynes uncertainty concept in 
mainstream economics. Using electronic archives, it shows that the frequency of its 
appearance in leading journals of economics has fallen rapidly from the 1950s. As well as to 
the declining popularity of Keynesian ideas since about 1970, the decrease in this use of the 
uncertainty concept is additionally related to the increasing mathematical formalization of 
economics and to the prevalence of a positivist emphasis on prediction. Some possible causes 
of this formalization are examined. Finally the essay discusses the prospects for a broadening 
of economics within universities, beyond a relatively narrow preoccupation with predictive 
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The limitations of formal modeling are underlined by Keynesian the concept of uncertainty.
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Readers of this journal are fully aware that the concept acquired a special meaning in the 
work of Frank H. Knight (1921) and John Maynard Keynes (1936, 1937). Despite some 
detailed differences (which we do not need to dwell on here – see Hoogduin 1987), both 
authors used the terms uncertainty and uncertain to refer to events regarding which no 
probability was calculable (Davidson 1972, 1991, Lawson 1985, Runde 1998, Cornwall and 
Cornwall 2001). Knight (1921, pp. 19-20) saw risk as “a quantity susceptible of 
measurement,” while uncertainty was “unmeasurable” and “non-quantitative.” As Keynes 
(1937: 217) put it, uncertainty applies to situations where there is “no scientific basis on 
which to form any calculable probability whatever.” Just as for Knight (1921) the existence of 
real-world uncertainty helps to explain why business firms exist, Keynes (1936) argued that 
uncertainty is a principal reason for the demand for liquidity in a money economy. 
Uncertainty thus becomes a vital concept in explaining at least two key economic institutions. 
Yet mainstream economists have mostly abandoned the concept of uncertainty. This paper 
examines the rise and fall of the Knight-Keynes uncertainty concept from the 1920s and 
1930s until today. This concept is chosen for another important reason: it is central to Keynes‟ 
economics, but by definition it resists increasingly fashionable quantification and eschews 
prediction. In this respect the uncertainty concept differs from other Keynesian ideas such as 
the multiplier. Bibliometric analysis suggests that the frequency of the appearance of 
Keynesian uncertainty in leading mainstream journals of economics has declined rapidly from 
the 1950s. It is likely that this decline is related to the increasing mathematical formalization 
of economics, the particular emphasis on mathematical models that yield predictions, and the 
fall in popularity of Keynesian ideas from the 1960s. Some possible causes of these shifts are 
examined.  
It is argued that while many Keynesians have embraced mathematical models, the 
analytical core of Keynes‟s theory – involving the uncertainty concept – places limits on the 
type, predictive capacity and extent of modeling employed. Discussion of these limits is 
unfashionable in mainstream economics today. 
The following section outlines the bibliometric methodology and results. The decline in 
citations to works by Keynes and Knight is also depicted. The section after that considers the 
negative correlation between the decline in the uncertainty concept and the increasing 
mathematical formalization of economics. A further section considers some causal 
underpinnings of the two developments, in terms of the culture and institutions of academic 
economics. The penultimate section considers the prospects for renewed post-Keynesian
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economics in the light of this analysis. 
The Rise and Fall of the Uncertainty Concept 
What has been the fate within mainstream economics of the Knight-Keynes concept of 
uncertainty since its appearance? The following methodology was adopted to gauge the 
frequency of appearance of the uncertainty concept in leading mainstream (Anglo-American) 
journals of economics. Journals were selected that had emerged no later than 1940. Table 1 
shows the ten journals of economics that come into this category. 
Without doubt the uncertainty concept has enjoyed more exposure in heterodox journals 
such as the Cambridge Journal of Economics, the Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, and 
the Journal of Economic Issues. But the point of this analysis is to examine the usage of the 
uncertainty concept in mainstream journals; these have much wider circulation and influence. 
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A major problem in gauging the frequency of the Knight-Keynes concept of uncertainty is 
that same term is widely used by many mainstream theorists to refer to situations where a 
probability can be calculated. Consequently, a search was made for articles in the nine 
journals where not only the words “uncertain” or “uncertainty” appeared but also contained 
the names “Keynes” or “Knight”.3 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 




Figure 1 About Here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Having determined the number of articles satisfying this condition, their frequency was 
calculated by dividing by the total number of articles published in the ten journals in each 
decade. The results are shown in Figure 1. 
Of course, bibliometric techniques of this kind have important limitations. Here the search 
criterion is relatively crude and it cannot exclude cases where, for example, Keynes or Knight 
are mentioned but a different concept of uncertainty is used. It would also exclude cases 
where “uncertain” was used in the sense of no calculable probability but mention was made of 
neither Keynes nor Knight. There are other possible types of false negative or false positive 
identification. But no obvious example of these exceptions was discovered by brief inspection 
of the numerous articles involved.
5
 Given these caveats, the claim here is that this particular 
search helps to gauge the changing impact of the Knight-Keynes uncertainty concept on the 
mainstream, and their relation to other related developments in mainstream economics. 
Note how in particular – by this measure – the use of the Knight-Keynes uncertainty 
concept rises dramatically from 1920 and reaches a peak of about seven per cent of articles in 
the 1940s, after the publication and widespread impact of the General Theory. It then declines 
dramatically from the 1950s to the 1960s, reaching levels between three and four percent. A 
further decline follows the 1980s and is sustained into the most recent period, to reach a low 
level of about two percent. 
As a comparative yardstick, the figure shows the percentage of articles citing the multiplier 
– by contrast a quantifiable concept that is also prominent in Keynesian models. Its usage is 
greater and its decline is not as precipitous as that for uncertainty. But this conclusion must be 
qualified by noting that no Boolean condition was imposed in this case. It was omitted 
because the multiplier is a distinctively Keynesian concept and does not suffer the same 
profound ambiguity as the concept of uncertainty.
5
 If the number of articles citing both 
Keynes and the multiplier is assessed, then the absolute level falls and the decline is more 
precipitous.
6
 It seems that it became acceptable for economists to write about the multiplier 
without mentioning Keynes.
7
 By contrast, it is generally necessary to mention Knight or 
Keynes to establish an uncertainty concept distinguishable from risk. But again we must be 
aware of the limitations of the methodology here.  
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This figure also depicts the even-more dramatic decline in citations to Keynes in the ten 
journals since the 1940s.
8
 Citations to Knight have never reached so high but have been in 
steady decline since the 1930s. 
Rather surprisingly, the percentage citations to Keynes in the ten journals begins to decline 
in the 1950s, when a form of Keynesianism was still dominant in the profession. There may 
be several reasons for this that are difficult to disentangle and assess. First, it may be due to a 
diminishing general propensity to cite past authors, correlating with the falling post-war status 
of the history of economic thought as a sub-discipline. (Similar arguments may help explain 
the habit of some economists to use the multiplier without citing Keynes.) Second, this early 
decline may also be a result of the extraordinary interest in Keynes‟s ideas in the 1940s, in the 
specific context of the Second World War, its aftermath, and the death of Keynes in 1946: the 
higher you rise the harder you fall. Third, interest shifted from the “economics of Keynes” to 
a form of “Keynesianism” (Leijonhufvud 1968) comprising IS-LM analysis, multiplier-
accelerator and other formal models – and generally excluding uncertainty in the Keynesian 
sense. As the model became supreme, the person was deemed less relevant. 
It is difficult to use bibliometric techniques to gauge the overall popularity of Keynesian 
ideas, but the declining pattern of citations to Keynes is otherwise consistent with the 
increasing attack on Keynesianism from Chicago and elsewhere, which became significant in 
the 1960s and gathered enormous force in the 1970s. The contention here is that 
Keynesianism faced an attack on several fronts: ideological, theoretical and mathematical.  
A full analysis of the tangled complexities of this battle is beyond the scope of this essay. 
Instead I suggest that an increasing and excessive emphasis on ostensibly predictive formal 
models was one of several reasons for the declining use of the Keynesian or Knightian 
concept of uncertainty. It is also true that this concept suffered the general fate of Keynesian 
theory, and a decline also due to theoretical and ideological opposition to Keynesianism. The 
purpose of this essay is to focus on one part of this complex story that has been previously 
much less explored. 
The Formalization of Economics and the Decline of the Uncertainty Concept 
Consider the relationship between the post-war decline of the use of the uncertainty concept 
in mainstream economics and the increasing formalization of economics.
9
 Although the roots 
of formalization go back as far as the deductivism of David Ricardo and the impact of the 
marginal revolution after the 1870s, it was not until the Second World War or after that 
mathematics began to dominate the discipline.  
This is confirmed by a study carried out by George J. Stigler, Stephen M. Stigler and Claire 
Friedland (1995) of the impact of mathematics in four leading journals.
10
 Before the 1920s, 
verbal expositions dominated more than 90 per cent of the articles published in these journals. 
After 1940, predominantly verbal exposition fell steadily to about 33 per cent of articles in the 
1960s. By the early 1990s, over 90 per cent of the articles in the leading and enduring journals 
were dominated by algebra, calculus and econometrics (Stigler et al, 1995: 342). After similar 
studies of the literature, Roger Backhouse (1998), Mark Blaug (1999, 2003) and E. Roy 
Weintraub (2002) argue that the “formalist revolution” in economics was consolidated in the 
late 1950s. This transformation was given some impetus by the long report to the American 
Economic Association by Howard R. Bowen (1953) that called for more extensive training in 
mathematics at graduate level. 
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This timing corresponds closely with the decline of the uncertainty concept, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. One major causal link is obvious: it is difficult to fit (non-quantitative) uncertainty 
into a model. It is a concept thus banished from mainstream economic theory. As Robert E. 
Lucas (1977: 15) wrote: “In cases of uncertainty, economic reasoning will be of no value.” 
This is redolent of Kenneth J. Arrow‟s (1951: 417) earlier discussion of Knight‟s uncertainty 
concept and his conclusion that without measurable probabilities “no theory can be 
formulated for this case.” Both authors then upheld that “economic reasoning” and “theory” 
were quantitative.
11
 In this context, economists pushed aside Keynesian or Knightian 
objections that uncertainty was incalculable. They either ignored the unquantifiable concept 
or gave uncertainty a subjective and quantifiable interpretation. 
Uncertainty does not mean that Keynesians have to abandon mathematical models. But they 
are faced with a choice: either to adopt models with grand predictive claims where the 
concept of uncertainty is downplayed, or to limit the use of modeling and inhibit the 
predictive claims. Keynes himself was firmly in the latter camp.
12
 
For much of the twentieth century, economics has been captivated by a vision of science 
where predictability has been the paramount aim. Economists often react to unpredictability 
with angst or even panic. When some results in monopoly theory were revealed as 
unpredictable, John Hicks (1939: 83-4) complained that “the stability conditions become 
indeterminate; and the basis on which economic laws can be constructed is therefore shorn 
away.” Hicks saw this as having “a very destructive consequence for economic theory.” 
Theory and formalization became virtually synonymous, to stand or fall together on the 
matter of predictive success. Subsequently Milton Friedman (1953) elevated prediction as the 
supreme goal for economists in his classic and highly influential article.  
Contemporary economics retains this devotion to model-based prediction. When prediction 
is thwarted within a particular mathematical approach, then often that type of approach falls 
out of favor. This is confirmed by considering developments in mathematics that show that 
predictability is sometimes unobtainable. When chaos theory emerged in the 1980s and 
demonstrated that outcomes in non-linear systems are often unpredictable, economists met 
this new mathematics with a significant flurry of interest.
13
 Furthermore some Keynesians 
saw this as an opportunity to embrace a form of modeling that was consistent with their ideas 
(Day 1983, Day and Shafer 1985, Rosser 1991). But mainstream discussion of chaos theory 
has since waned, and it has never been given the attention warranted by the ubiquity of non-
linearities in the real world. This is apparent in the bibliometric data in Figure 2. After 1995 
the frequency of the term “chaos theory” in all JSTOR journals in economics reached a low 
level. Mainstream economics is not simply focused on mathematical models; it elevates those 
models that purport to yield predictions and downplays those that show that our powers of 
prediction are limited.   
For example, a model of the business cycle developed by Richard Goodwin (1972, 1990) 
involves non-linear dynamics where (with some parameter values) outcomes are highly 
sensitive to initial conditions, thus eroding its predictive capacity. Despite its reputable 
mathematics and relatively appealing formal characteristics, the Goodwin model has remained 
rarely cited in leading journals since its inception. To date since its initial publication it has 
received only eleven citations to articles in the ten economics journals in Table 1. It seems 
that anything that gets in the way of the Holy Grail of model-based prediction is pushed aside, 
even when it is has a strong mathematical component. 
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Figure 2 About Here 
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Neither has the “complexity revolution” yet shifted mainstream economics from its 
predictive goals. Although there has been significant discussion of complexity in mainstream 
journals, it has not yet shaken the belief that the main aim of economics is to build models 
that yield useful predictions. Rather than look real-world complexity in the face, economists 
have remained in an artificial world of much simpler models, partly to maintain the rhetoric of 
prediction. As yet, established techniques for dealing with complexity, such as agent-based 
modeling and Kauffman-type NK models, are generally rare in leading mainstream journals. 
To recapitulate, the decline of the uncertainty concept coincides with the inverse process of 
a rising mathematical formalism in mainstream economics that was directed toward the task 
of prediction. Partly because of its intrinsic non-quantifiability, the Knight-Keynes 
uncertainty concept declined in significance. But the evidence suggests that it is not only the 
non-quantifiability of uncertainty that has been a problem for the mainstream. Brief 
consideration here of other ideas such as chaos theory and complexity suggests that the 
additional problem of unpredictability is an additional reason why uncertainty is shunned.
14
 
Chaos theory and complexity involve mathematical formalism without generally leading to 
adequate predictions, and they have not yet had a major impact on economics. 
Uncertainty is not only unquantifiable but it restricts precise prediction. It is thus prevented 
by a double-lock from entry into the mainstream. Mainstream economics would have to 
abandon both its obsession with formalization and its primary goal of prediction for the door 
to be opened.
15
 If mainstream economics followed the advice of David Colander (2000) and 
others, and retained formalism but entered the often unpredictable world of complexity, then 
this alone would not re-admit uncertainty.
16
 But the downgrading of prediction may itself 
raise questions and concerns concerning the role of models. In contemporary mainstream 
economics the issues of formalism and predictability remain intimately connected. 
The Culture and Institutions of Academic Economics 
The cults of formalism and prediction have spread much wider than economics itself. The 
impetus for quantification has ancient historical sources (Crosby 1998). Philip Mirowski 
(1989) and others have argued that the emulation of the apparent predictive success of other 
sciences such as physics from the nineteenth century has led to the adoption of a particular 
kind of formalism within economics. The influence of positivism is also held to be 
responsible for an increased emphasis on prediction-yielding models in several sciences. 
Philosophers of science in general (Quine 1953, Bhaskar 1975) and of economics in particular 
(Caldwell 1982, McCloskey 1994) have long heralded a post-positivist era where prediction is 
no longer a supreme goal, but this shift of view is not yet reflected in the day-to-day practice 
in several natural and social sciences.
17
  
Arguably, major reasons for the persistence of positivism and its emphases on 
quantification and prediction are found within the institutionalized practices of academia 
itself. As university sectors within developed countries have greatly expanded since the 
1950s, university researchers have been under increasing pressure to justify their existence 
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and their receipt of financial support from the public purse and elsewhere. The positive 
benefits of this expansion are partly offset by a consequent distortion of research. Academics 
are asked to seek out grants where research has often to be justified in terms of some practical 
or predictive value. Research that seeks primarily to explain, and makes lesser claims to 
predict, is less attractive for those on grant-awarding bodies with missions to promote 
research that proffers immediate practical consequences. 
Global pressures have impacted on modern universities in the twentieth century and led to 
significant overall changes in the nature of teaching and research. But the ways in which 
different disciplines have evolved in response to these pressures express varied histories and 
dynamics. Particularly with formalism in economics, there are strong elements of positive 
feedback and path dependence. But we also have to understand the general academic context 
in which these changes take place. 
Before the Second World War, universities were reserved for a rich or intelligent minority. 
Despite pressures from business and religious institutions, they managed in places to dispense 
a relatively broad education and maintained an ethos for the pursuit of truth. This changed in 
most developed countries sometime after the Second World War. Especially since the 1960s, 
the university has become an institution much more oriented to specialist professional training 
under the behest of business corporations.  
Thorstein Veblen (1918) observed some of the early stages of this evolution within 
universities long ago. Others (Callahan 1962, Bloom 1988, Lutz and Field 1998, Kirp 2003, 
Greenberg 2007) have charted the post-war decline of broad and questioning inquiry, and the 
rise of narrower forms of professional training targeted at the needs of business. Students are 
less encouraged to pursue big questions. They are urged instead to acquire qualifications that 
signal skills that can be hired on the jobs market.  
Together these forces eroded enclaves of broad liberal education, vastly expanded 
specialized professional training, led to explicit requirements to account for the economic 
value of university research, and promoted the increasing use of league tables and formalized 
research assessments to pressure academics to publish research in acknowledged outlets.  
These background institutional and cultural forces have impacted upon disciplines in 
different ways. Economics suffered in a peculiar manner because it had established a type and 
degree of formalism that allowed research output to be assessed principally in terms of 
mathematical elegance and predictive claims. Economists were judged and became 
employable for their aptitudes for statistical analysis or predictive models.  
There is a conservative trend in any science. Robert J. Shiller (2008) writes of the herding 
of economists around conventional views for fear of bucking the trend. This problem is 
especially severe in a discipline as monolithic as economics, dominated as it is by relatively 
few theoretical paradigms and approaches, with the control of journals and other resources 
concentrated in relatively few academic institutions (Hodgson and Rothman 1999). The 
oligopolistic distribution of power within the discipline affects both publications and funding. 
Papers of a less technique-driven nature, or those that employ techniques that differ from 
those that prevail in the mainstream, are more difficult to publish in prestigious journals; grant 
applications that are bereft of models or predictive claims are unlikely to be approved by 
refereeing economists; and candidates without a good modeling portfolio are unlikely to be 
promoted. In a process of cumulative causation, the cult of prediction-oriented technique 
feeds on itself. There is a peacock‟s tail process of ongoing selection and replication, where 
output is judged on its mathematical magnificence rather than its verisimilitude or practical 
usefulness.
18
 Jerry Ravetz (1994-95) thus concludes that economics has become “an elite folk 
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science.” One particular feature of this transformation has been the exclusion of the concept 
of uncertainty. 
Prospects for a post-Keynesian Economics 
This rather pessimistic line of argument raises the question of the prospects of revival of the 
kind of Keynesian or institutional economics. On the other hand, do recent economic events 
provide a window of opportunity? The world financial crash of 2008 signaled the most 
serious global economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Just as John Maynard 
Keynes is remembered for his critique of the economic theories and policies of his day, critics 
of mainstream economics may wonder if the latest crisis will help to revive the discipline by 
exposing the limitations of current economic theory and policy.  
While economics as a discipline evolves slowly, the ideological mood has changed rapidly. 
The financial crisis of 2008 led to remarkable retractions among world leaders of previous 
commitments to lightly-regulated financial markets. The market is no longer seen as the 
solution to every problem. After decades of neglect, journalists and politicians have pointed to 
the relevance of Keynesian ideas.
19
  
These changes in ideology among world politicians create a different environment for 
economists. But as yet there are no strong shifts of opinion or practice among academic 
leaders of our profession. We search with difficulty in departments of economics for similar 
conversions or recantations.
20
 Despite the appeals of many, and the energetic appeals of 
Keynes-leaning Nobel Laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, there is little sign that the 
majority of economists are returning to the classic texts in general or Keynes in particular. 
Mainstream economists explicitly admit that they see little warrant or value in reading the 
sages of the past (Dasgupta 2002). Despite the biggest global economic crash since the 1930s, 
the preoccupation with mathematical technique remains, and the signs are of “business as 
usual” (Cohen 2009). 
History gives us little further grounds for optimism. Although the Great Depression led to 
the rise of a form of Keynesian economics, it also helped to provide an impetus for more 
extensive use of mathematics in economics. A younger generation of economists, impatient 
with the failure of the older economists to find solutions, turned to mathematical models as 
well as the Keynesian doctrine.
21
 The 1930s “revolution” in economic thought promoted not 
only a relatively simplified version of Keynesianism but also it was led by a younger 
generation of economists including Paul Samuelson and others that promoted formal 
economic models. They emphasized those parts of Keynesianism that could be modeled, and 
were impatient with the equivocal ruminations of older economists that had buried themselves 
in historical facts in their attempts to understand capitalism‟s laws of motion. 
The attraction of this more mathematical approach was partly its technocratic lure, and 
partly because it proposed apparent solutions to the urgent problem of the day. It appeared 
that increasing a variable called G could alleviate the problem of unemployment. Although 
Keynes himself warned of the limitations of mathematical technique in economics 
(Moggridge, 1992: 621-3), he was championed by a younger generation who saw 
mathematics as a tool for the construction of predictive models. 
Although the Great Depression established a Keynesian macroeconomics, it also gave 
impetus to the process of mathematical formalization that gradually accelerated in the post-
war period. Although Keynes fell out of vogue from about 1970, and the character of 
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mainstream economics has changed in other respects in recent decades, its obsession with 
technique over substance remains.  
In 1988 a Commission set up by the American Economic Association examined the state of 
graduate education in economics in the US. The Commission expressed its fear that “graduate 
programs may be turning out a generation with too many idiot savants skilled in technique but 
innocent of real economic issues” (Krueger 1991: 1044–5). Alan Blinder (1990: 445), a 
member of the Commission, commented: 
Both students and faculty find economics obsessed with technique over substance . . . the 
many macro and micro theory exams the Commission examined . . . tested mathematical 
puzzle-solving ability, not substantive knowledge about economics  . . . Only 14 percent of 
the students report that their core courses put substantial emphasis on “applying economic 
theory to real-world problems.” 
Since the 1988 Commission there has been a sideline litany of complaints from leading 
members of the profession, including Nobel Laureates such as Wassily Leontief (1982), 
Ronald Coase (1997) and Milton Friedman (1999). But David Colander (2009) lamented that 
none of these prominent warnings “had any effect on US graduate economic education.” As 
Mark Blaug (1998: 45) wrote pessimistically: “We have created a monster that is very 
difficult to stop.”  
Despite the post-2008 rise in popularity of Keynes‟s ideas among politicians, none of this 
additional information gives hope for a revival from within mainstream economics of the kind 
of broad-minded thinking, grounded in a wider erudition, which was typical of Knight, 
Keynes and others in their time. 
As Paul Davidson (1972) and others have pointed out, the form of Keynesianism that 
enjoyed its heyday from the 1940s to the 1960s did not place Keynes‟s uncertainty concept at 
the centre of the analysis. Yet some Keynesians have fully acknowledged uncertainty while 
retaining a role for formal models. A seminal essay by Jan Kregel (1976) is an example of this 
genre, and it explicitly faces the problem of modeling in the face of Keynesian uncertainty.  
Note that while establishing a legitimate heuristic and partial role of models in this context, 
Kregel abandons all general predictive aims. He echoes Keynes‟s claim that in “it was in the 
nature a monetary economy that the future could not be known” (Kregel 1976: 221). Kregel 
indicates that is possible to formulate formal models of an environment of uncertainty, but 
these are for tracking particular causal interactions rather than yielding predictions. According 
to Kregel, this is the type of modeling implied by Keynes in the General Theory. Yet Kregel‟s 
argument suffered the fate of the Keynesian movement as a whole. This suggest that it is not 
the quest of formal modeling as such that accounts for the decline of Keynesian ideas such as 
uncertainty, but the belief that the primary purpose of models is prediction, and a growing 
obsession with formal technique over substance which has led economists to ignore or 
downplay the realities of a modern capitalist economy. 
Neither crises nor failures of prediction necessarily impel economists in the direction of 
realism. One likely reaction to the current downturn is that we should try harder to develop 
better models. Perhaps we should. But if these models are primarily designed to yield correct 
predictions, then their success will be highly limited. We must also learn the vital lesson that 
models on their own are never enough, and prediction is sometimes impossible even with the 
best of models. We need better models, but their primary aim is to aid causal explanation.  
Economists need to appreciate the limitations of modeling. These limitations are generic 
and result from the intractabilities of uncertainty, complexity and system openness in the real 
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world. In such a context a primary role for models is heuristic rather than predictive. Also a 
better understanding of our current predicament must also come from a much fuller 
appreciation of both economic history and the history of ideas. What is required is a 
wholesale revitalization of the culture within the economics profession. 
Conclusion 
The concept of uncertainty is not only central to Keynesian economics, but also its degree of 
prevalence is an indicator of the scientific culture of the economics profession. Its decline in 
usage is one litmus test among others of a culture change within mainstream economics over 
the last half century. 
A primary conclusion of the analysis here is that the decline of the Knight-Keynes concept 
of uncertainty in mainstream economics is due to a complex of factors, including the ongoing 
fashion for models that purport to yield predictions, as well as ideological and doctrinal 
attacks on Keynesianism itself. It is notable that mathematical models that are unreliable for 
prediction – including non-linear and chaotic dynamics – have also proved unpopular. The 
problem with mainstream economics is not simply its obsession with technique over 
substance, but also the limited and unsuitable types of formalism that are adopted. This essay 
is not a call for the banishment of all formalism from economics, but for the adoption of 
mathematical approaches that are more suitable, and predictive claims that are more modest, 
in the context of a much broader and partially discursive culture of enquiry. 
The severe downturn in most developed economies since 2008 has generated renewed 
discussion of the relevance of Keynes‟s ideas among politicians and journalists. But 
regrettably there is little evidence that this new thinking has penetrated the mainstream of the 
economics profession. Furthermore, a return to Keynes means much more than the 
rehabilitation of a relatively neglected doctrine. The concept of uncertainty itself signals a 
retreat from the currently overwhelming obsessions with mathematical quantification, 
modeling and prediction. What would be involved is much than the rehabilitation of a single 
stream of thought. There is a need to reverse the priority of technique over substance in 
modern economics, and to bring the discipline back to its previous close intellectual 
engagement with other disciplines such as psychology, sociology, politics, history and 
philosophy. 
To understand the current economic crisis we have to look at both economic history and the 
history of economic thought. To understand how markets work we have to dispense with 
empty proclamations of rationality and delve into psychology and elsewhere. To understand 
how economics has taken a wrong turn we have to appreciate work in the philosophy of 
economics and the relationship between economics and ideology. These unfashionable 
discourses have to be brought back into the centre of the economic curricula and rehabilitated 
as vital areas of enquiry. Unless mainstream economics takes heed of these warnings and 
proves its relevance for the understanding of the most severe crisis of the capitalist system 
since the 1930s, then it will be doomed to irrelevance as a practical tool for understanding and 
improving our economic condition.  
Much greater dialogue is required between economics and the other social sciences. This is 
not only intrinsically vital, but it has become imperative because both economics and 
sociology have lost their preceding consensuses concerning the definitions and boundaries of 
their disciplines (Hodgson 2008). This suggests a need for some reorganization of the social 
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sciences in universities. These needed curricular and organizational reforms will not come 
about easily. The task ahead is immense. 
Such reorganization should place critical philosophical reflection at its apex. Notably both 
Knight and Keynes had significant training in philosophy. Consequently they could search for 
meaning and understanding without modeling or quantification. They were not exceptional 
but typical of the intellectual giants of our discipline: Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred 
Marshall, Thorstein Veblen and Joseph Schumpeter all studied philosophy. Yet today most 
social scientists have little knowledge of the philosophy of science, and economists are no 
exception. Philosophy provides the conceptual tools to reflect upon the place and meaning of 
economic ideas and techniques. As noted above, it should be supplemented by knowledge of 
both the history of both economics and economies. Unless there is such extended and 
reutilized critical reflection in such an historical context, mainstream economics will remain a 
branch of applied mathematics and fall further down the slippery slope toward scientific and 




1. This essay focuses on one of several other issues raised in Hodgson (2009) and uses some 
material from that essay. The author is very grateful for the valuable comments of Rick 
Adkisson, Mark Setterfield and anonymous referees on previous drafts of this essay.  
2. I deliberately use the term “post-Keynesian” here rather than “Post Keynesian” because I 
refer literally to any economics after and accommodating Keynes, rather than any specific 
variety of Keynesianism. 
3. The Boolean search condition is thus: ((“uncertain” OR “uncertainty”) AND (“Keynes” OR 
“Knight”)). 
4. Date of last available (in October 2009) appearance in JSTOR searchable database of 
academic journals (www.jstor.org).  
5. A full and detailed textual analysis of the thousands of articles involved will have to await a 
much larger study with research assistance currently unavailable to this author. 
6. It should be noted that precursors of the multiplier concept (without using that term) are 
found in works by Clark (1917) and others (see Shackle 1967: 264-6). The term “multiplying 
effect“ appeared as early as 1921 in a U.S. Report of the President’s Conference on 
Unemployment (Hodgson 2004: 311). 
7. The data for (“multiplier” AND “Keynes”) are not shown on the figure. 
8. The phrase “investment volatility” has been used by both Keynesians and others. Its data 
(not illustrated here) show a rapid increase in usage after the 1970s, overtaking the concept of 
uncertainty in the 1990s. 
9. See also Hodgson (2009). 
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10. The notions of “formalism” and “formalization” require definition. Although the term has 
a broader meaning, I follow others in this context in associating it with the imposition of 
mathematical forms and models (Woo 1986, Chick 1998, Dow 1998, Krugman 1998). 
11. The four journals were American Economic Review, the Economic Journal, the Journal of 
Political Economy and the Quarterly Journal of Economics, which are all among the ten 
represented in the preceding section. 
12. Arrow later seemed to modify his view, with the publication of several milestone 
theoretical articles with discursive content. 
13. Keynes wrote to Roy Harrod on 16 July 1938: “In economics . . . to convert a model into a 
quantitative formula is to destroy its usefulness as an instrument of thought” (Keynes, 1973: 
299). See also Moggridge (1992: 621–3). 
14. See, for example, Baumol and Quandt (1985), Grandmont (1987), Kelsey (1988), Barnett 
et al. (1989), Baumol and Benhabib (1989), Brock and Malliaris (1989), Radzicki (1990), 
Brock et al. (1991), Benhabib (1992), Bullard and Butler (1993), Carrier (1993).  
15. Note that the existence of uncertainty does not make prediction impossible. Knight (1921) 
saw the lumping together of assets under the umbrella of the firm as a reaction to uncertainty, 
and Keynes (1937) pointed out that people facing uncertainty generally fall back on regular 
patterns of behaviour, such as the imitation of others. But these (important and useful) 
predictions are imprecise, highly contingent and difficult to derive via a non-trivial 
mathematical model. Kregel‟s (1976) important consideration of modelling “in the face of 
uncertainty” is discussed later below. 
16. Note my slight difference here with Lawson (1997), who emphasizes the problem of 
formalism alone. By contrast I have argued (Hodgson 2006, ch. 7) that some types of 
mathematical formalism – in particular heuristic models – are invulnerable to Lawson‟s 
critique. See also Sugden (2000). 
17. Existing complexity discourse is no panacea. Its diverse content ranges from playful 
simulation to post-modernism and social constructivism, and it is sometimes of challengeable 
coherence or value (Horgan 1995). Nevertheless Colander is right to argue that economists 
should face up to real-world complexity.  
18. The term “positivism” is used in a variety of different ways. Here I use it in a sense that is 
close to its original Comtean meaning, to describe a view of science that emphasises the role 
of prediction more than causal explanation (Lenzer 1998). In this sense there are strong 
positivist traits in Friedman‟s (1953) highly influential article. 
19. For a topical comment on this see the article by Paul Krugman 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?_r=1  (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
20. See, for example, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jun/01/larry-elliott-fantasy-
economics, http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=10683/t_blank, and 
http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/03/the-unfortunate-uselessness-of-most-state-of-the-art-
academic-monetary-economics/, all accessed 27 July 2009. 
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21. The notable recent conversion of the influential Richard Posner to Keynesianism, after his 
first reading of the General Theory, is of great importance. But Posner is an unusual and part-
time academic who is also a judge. See http://www.tnr.com/article/how-i-became-keynesian 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
22. See Gunnar Myrdal‟s (1972: 6-7) own reminiscences on this era, as well as similar 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Articles Citing to Keynes or Knight, Estimated Percentage of 
Articles Containing the Knight-Keynes Concept of Uncertainty, and Percentage of 
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